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INTRODUCTION 
The Thirteenth Amendment—the commandment that “neither slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States”—
did not truly eradicate incidents of slavery. This is hardly a controversial 
point. The postwar emergence of the Black Codes—laws meant to con-
fine African Americans’ ability to rent, travel, and live as free humans 
would expect to—ensured that slavery’s conditions continued unabated.1 
The Amendment itself permits slavery to exist “as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”2 Still, did the 
                                                     
* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Capital Habeas Unit, Eastern District of Arkansas. Thanks for 
the generous feedback I received from participants at the Korematsu Center’s 13th Amendment Con-
ference. For their comments on previous drafts, I’m grateful to Daniel Sharfstein, Owen Jones, and 
members of the Legal History of Race in the United States and Legal Scholarship seminars at Van-
derbilt Law School.  
 1. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 199–201 (1988) (describing Black Codes); EDWARD 
MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE PERIOD OF 
RECONSTRUCTION 29–33 (1871) (reproducing Mississippi’s Black Codes). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. Of course, I am hardly the first person to note this point. For 
an analysis of the “punishment for crime” clause and its contemporary relevance, see Kamal Ghali, 
No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime: The Punishment Clause and Sexual Slavery, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 607 (2008). 
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Thirteenth Amendment not abolish the most fundamental characteristic 
of chattel slavery—the ability to trade in and profit from the bodies of 
other humans? Surprisingly, the answer is no. Even after emancipation, 
slavery remained lucrative business in the form of antebellum contracts 
for slaves. More surprisingly, most courts, and ultimately the U.S. Su-
preme Court, permitted sellers of slaves on contract to recover the debts 
owed to them. The Thirteenth Amendment no longer permitted com-
merce in flesh, but humans continued to have monetary value. 
Why should we care about this seemingly esoteric episode in our 
legal history? Did the post-bellum viability of slave contracts have any 
real effect upon the freedmen? Lawsuits between old slave traders did 
not diminish the way in which the freedmen carried themselves in the 
world. If the remnants of slavery remained, that had nothing to do with 
these commercial disputes. The Thirteenth Amendment had done its 
work by freeing the slaves; contract law could sort out the paper rem-
nants. 
This is the view of the only work to thoroughly assess the interac-
tion between the slave-contract cases and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Professor Andrew Kull’s thought-provoking study from two decades 
ago.3 This Symposium provides an opportune moment to push back on 
that view and to suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment could have—
and indeed, should have—prevented enforcement of slave contracts. I do 
so not only with a fresh analysis of the known slave-contract cases, but 
also by discussing a case that has been entirely unnoticed until now—one 
in which the purchaser was himself a former slave attempting to free his 
family. In this context, the consequence of enforcing the debt was literal-
ly to re-enslave the buyer. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s ultimate con-
clusion, it is incorrect that “[n]either the rights nor the interests of 
those . . . [held] lately in bondage [were] affected” by the decision to en-
force a slave contract.4 Far from being purely “private” agreements, these 
instruments had a deep influence on the world beyond the parties. 
                                                     
 3. Andrew Kull, The Enforceability After Emancipation of Debts Contracted for the Purchase 
of Slaves, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 493, 530–32 (1994). Only one other author has devoted significant 
attention to the slave-contract cases. In two pieces, Diane J. Klein assessed the cases in a manner 
more sympathetic to nonenforcement than Kull’s approach. Diane J. Klein, Naming and Framing the 
“Subject” of Antebellum Slave Contracts: Introducing Julia, “A Certain Negro Slave,” “A Man,” 
Joseph, Eliza, and Albert, 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 243 (2008); Diane J. Klein, Paying Eliza: 
Comity, Contracts and Critical Race Theory—19th Century Choice of Law Doctrine and the Valida-
tion of Antebellum Contracts for the Purchase and Sale of Human Beings, 20 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 
(2006). These articles address the slave-contract cases from the perspectives of conflict of laws and 
critical race theory. Professor Kull’s article remains the only published piece to grapple with the 
Thirteenth Amendment implications of the slave-contract cases. 
 4. Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 663 (1872). 
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In short, this Article aims to fill in a missing chapter in Thirteenth 
Amendment history, one that contributes to our understanding of why the 
Amendment has not played more of a role in our constitutional law. In 
the slave-contract cases, a provision that positively enacted a great natu-
ral-law principle—the freedom of man—succumbed to the sacredness of 
personal property rights. An Amendment that promised a revolution in 
federal-state relations could not overcome the entrenched principles of 
local commercial law. This outcome was not inevitable, though, as the 
opinion of one iconoclastic judge, Henry Clay Caldwell, shows. We do 
well to examine this history—actual and alternative—as we consider the 
Amendment’s position in today’s legal landscape and the possibilities it 
contains. 
I. THE SLAVE-CONTRACT PROBLEM 
The typical form of slave paper was a run-of-the-mill promissory 
note—the buyer’s guarantee to pay the seller sometime in the future, of-
ten secured by the purchased slaves themselves. There was nothing ex-
traordinary about such agreements in the slaveholding states, but they 
caused a unique problem when sellers sought to enforce them after the 
Civil War. The Thirteenth Amendment banned slavery, and the Four-
teenth Amendment voided all claims “for the loss of . . . any slave.”5 Yet 
appeals to the courts for payment on a slave contract appeared both to 
vindicate slavery and to compensate a former slave owner. How were 
courts to reconcile the Reconstruction Amendments with what had pre-
viously been a common commercial transaction? 
From one perspective, courts asked to enforce slave contracts faced 
a practical policy choice: which party was to bear the loss? One way or 
the other, someone had to eat the value of the slave property embodied in 
the paper. Emancipation had caused the buyer to forfeit his slave. Should 
he forfeit the purchase price to boot? Or should the loss be split between 
buyer and seller by refusing to permit the seller the money owed to him? 
The quantity of these contracts made the loss-spreading question even 
more vexing. Although the value of slaves in the form of postwar slave 
contracts is not certain, slave contracts were common. Courts in every 
former Confederate state, and even in some Union ones, faced remorse-
ful buyers who sought to be relieved of their slave debt. Especially given 
the enormous value of slaves—one historian has estimated it to be eighty 
percent of the gross national product in 1860, equivalent to $9.75 trillion 
                                                     
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“[N]either the United States or any State shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss of emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be 
held illegal and void.”). 
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in today’s dollars6—we can be fairly certain that this legal battle threat-
ened the ruin of either sellers or buyers as a class.7 Courts adjudicating 
slave-contract disputes were thus the final decisionmakers in a scuffle 
over the scraps of antebellum wealth. 
Quite outside of this practical quandary, slave contracts posed a 
great moral problem: did the decision to order payment for slaves not 
sanction the law of slavery? Private agreements for slaves were clearly 
valid at the time of their making, yet emancipation had wrecked the 
foundation on which they were based. How could courts reconcile these 
contract claims with a brand new Constitution—one that finally recog-
nized the freedom of the nation’s black men and women? 
The answers to these questions, for most jurists, were determined 
by neither practical considerations nor moral reasoning. They were de-
termined by the forms of the law. Courts consistently applied conven-
tional concepts of commercial law to find that the slave seller was enti-
tled to payment. Startlingly, most courts failed to consider that the Thir-
teenth Amendment might have something to say about how the issue 
should be handled. Even some judges who declined to enforce the con-
tracts limited their reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment, instead reach-
ing their conclusions though typical legal arguments and forms. The 
overall result was a lost opportunity to secure the rights of freedmen. Yet 
some courts did find the contracts to perpetuate slavery. Their opinions 
offer a different version of history, one whereby the Thirteenth Amend-
ment provides a substantive guarantee of freedom. 
II. LEGAL BASES FOR ENFORCING SLAVE CONTRACTS 
As the Alabama Supreme Court set about deciding whether to en-
force slave contracts, it noted the novelty of the issue: “It is in vain to 
look for authorities in such cases as this, as there never was, before the 
occurrence of such an event as the recent emancipation of the slaves in 
this country.”8 The decisions of high courts throughout the South belied 
the hollowness of this rhetoric. Courts had ample precedent to follow. 
Principles of antebellum constitutional, common, and commercial law—
not the Reconstruction Amendments—supplied the legal grounds for 
deciding most slave-contract cases. By relying on these older authorities, 
                                                     
 6. David Brion Davis, Foreword: The Rocky Road to Freedom: Crucial Barriers to Abolition 
in the Antebellum Years, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY 
RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT xvi (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010). 
 7. Contemporary courts understood the gravity of the question in the same way. As the South 
Carolina Supreme Court put it in a case involving the descendants of John C. Calhoun, “The case 
before us is of interest to the community, from the large amount of debt which will be affected by 
the decision.” Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283, 291 (1870). 
 8. Fitzpatrick v. Hearne, 44 Ala. 171, 175 (1870). 
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courts almost universally upheld existing debts for slaves.9 There were 
two distinct circumstances in which the question of enforcement came 
before judges. In the first, state legislatures attempted to strip courts of 
jurisdiction to hear suits brought by sellers asking for enforcement. In the 
second, buyers argued that slave contracts were unenforceable by their 
very nature. 
A. Avoidance Through Legislative Means 
As a condition of readmission to the Union, Congress required for-
mer Confederate states to hold conventions for the passage of new state 
constitutions.10 Only after Congress approved the resulting document 
would the state be permitted representation at the federal level. One of 
the key items on the conventions’ agendas was debt forgiveness—
including forgiveness for debts owed on slave contracts. Six states pro-
duced, and Congress subsequently approved, constitutions prohibiting 
judicial enforcement of slave contracts.11 
What were the motives of the men who passed these provisions? 
Some certainly objected to the idea that the courts of a free state should 
be available to provide a remedy to former slave owners.12 Others, how-
ever, sensed in the elimination of slave debt the opportunity to provide 
compensation that the Fourteenth Amendment otherwise prohibited.13 
Indeed, nullification of the contracts might be the worse outcome from a 
moral standpoint. The buyers had bet on slavery in its final hours, and 
forgiving their debt could serve as nod to those who held fast to the 
South. Perhaps nowhere is the ambiguity of the situation made clearer 
than in a correspondence between Gideon Pillow, a Confederate general 
                                                     
 9. Professor Kull has contended that it was right to apply pure commercial law to the cases and 
that they were correctly decided on that basis. See Kull, supra note 3, at 531 (“[T]o decide the case 
in favor of the buyer of slaves, whatever the grounds on which the court denied the seller’s suit, was, 
as a matter of commercial law, to decide it wrong.”); id. at 532 ([T]o give [nullification arguments] 
practical effect would have involved the nation in a political revolution that Reconstruction did not 
envision.”). To void slave contracts through the Thirteenth Amendment, he argued, would have 
disturbed settled legal rules and imposed a brand of retroactive justice that the political forces of the 
time could not achieve. See id. (“A retroactive revision of property relations is easily within the 
province of political justice, forming the basis for all confiscation and reallocation problems, but no 
such revision was attempted by the Thirteenth Amendment.”). Though this Article disputes Profes-
sor Kull’s conclusion, his piece is a nuanced and enlightening treatment that explains why it was not 
self-evident to Reconstruction actors that nullifying slave contracts was the correct move. I am in-
debted to his thorough analysis of the problem. 
 10. For general background on the conventions, see FONER, supra note 1, at 316–33. 
 11. The six states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina 
(with the caveat that Alabama’s provision was an ordinance rather than an amendment to the state 
constitution). For the text of these provisions, as well as proposed provisions that failed, see Kull, 
supra note 3, at 533–38. 
 12. See id. at 522–23. 
 13. See id. at 523–24. 
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and one of the largest slaveholders in Arkansas and Tennessee, and Sena-
tor Charles Sumner, the Radical Republican stalwart. Sumner had just 
proposed a bill stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear suits seek-
ing enforcement of contracts for slaves. Pillow sent his thanks; he was 
being sued for $109,000 in slave debt.14 As Pillow’s enthusiasm indi-
cates, the question of whether to enforce may have been a moral wash.15 
When it came time to test the nullification measures in courts, judg-
es had little to do with these real-world ambiguities. Their reasoning was 
almost purely legal, and it was based not on express policy considera-
tions but rather on a technical question of constitutional law: did any 
state in the Confederacy actually secede? Clearly, sellers argued in seek-
ing enforcement, the nullification measures abrogated slave contracts and 
violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.16 Buyers responded, 
however, that the abrogation was permissible for two reasons. First, the 
states were outside the Union when they devised the ban on slave-
contract enforcement—in other words, they were not actually “states” 
subject to the prohibition of the Contracts Clause. Second, because Con-
gress approved the state constitutions—or “dictated” their terms, as one 
court put it17—and because the Federal Constitution did not prevent 
Congress from impairing the obligation of contracts, there was no 
wrongdoing on the part of the states. 
This rather clever argument succeeded only in Georgia, abetted by 
Congress’s decision to strike a number of debt-forgiveness provisions 
from the state’s proposed constitution while leaving its slave-contract 
prohibition intact.18 The United States Supreme Court deflated it once 
and for all in White v. Hart.19 The Court held that the state constitution, 
far from being dictated by Congress, was “voluntary,” and even had it 
not been, Congress had no authority to approve a state measure that vio-
                                                     
 14. See id. at 506. The correspondence is more fully related in CHARLES FAIRMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, PART ONE 860 n.289 (1971). 
 15. See Kull, supra note 3, at 530 (“Depending on the viewpoint of the observer, the nullifica-
tion of slave debts was thus either the last tribute due to loyalty, or the last exaction of a Bourbon 
class, advanced in the name of its final representatives. Inevitably it was both at once, besides being 
(in the eyes of others still) the final vindication of longstanding abolitionist doctrine on the illegality 
of slavery by natural law.”). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obliga-
tion of Contracts . . . .”).  Some jurists sought a way around this conclusion by drawing a distinction 
between a state’s authority to regulate its courts’ jurisdiction and its authority to impair contracts. 
See Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 660 (1869) (McClure, J., dissenting). However, the prevailing 
view was that to strip individuals of a judicial forum to enforce their contracts was to impair the 
obligations of the contracts themselves. 
 17. Shorter v. Cobb, 39 Ga. 285, 303–04 (1869). 
 18. Id. at 305; White v. Hart, 39 Ga. 306, 307 (1869). 
 19. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1871). 
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lated the Federal Constitution.20 To the notion that the state had seceded 
from the Union, the Court held that for the duration of the war the states’ 
“rights under the Constitution were suspended, but not destroyed.”21 
Thus perished the theory that nullification of slave contracts fell outside 
the Contracts Clause.22 
The real flaw of White v. Hart was not so much its take on whether 
a state could leave the Union—a serious and nuanced question in the ju-
risprudence of the time23—but rather that it entirely ignored the Thir-
teenth Amendment. The Court failed to distinguish contracts involving 
subject matter such as bonds—another context in which the legality of 
secession arose—from those involving human bondage. Even had a state 
no ability to leave the Union, the question remained whether the state 
constitutional provisions were an appropriate means of enforcing the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery. Chief Justice Salmon 
Chase, at least, believed that they were.24 Few, however, stopped to con-
sider how the Reconstruction Amendments might have altered the origi-
nal Constitution’s Contracts Clause. Even those judges who believed the 
state provisions to be constitutional appeared more concerned with fair-
ness toward the contracting parties than with the postwar status of the 
freedmen.25 By relying upon the Contracts Clause to require enforce-
                                                     
 20. Id. at 649. 
 21. Id. at 651. 
 22. The Court’s rationales in White v. Hart might be questioned. It seems absurd to claim that 
states taking up arms against the federal government remained part of the Union during conflict—a 
point that several contemporary jurists acknowledged. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
700, 737 (1869) (Grier, J., dissenting) (“This is to be decided as a political fact, not as a legal fiction. 
This court is bound to know and notice the public history of the nation. If I regard the truth of history 
for the last eight years, I cannot discover the State of Texas as one of these United States.”). In the 
face of this reality, White v. Hart had to rely on a semantic distinction between territories, which 
Congress would “admit to the Union” as new states, and the reconstructed antebellum states, which 
under the Reconstruction Acts would not be “readmitted to the union” but instead would be “enti-
tled” or “admitted to” representation in Congress. Hart, 80 U.S. at 652. The language of the Recon-
struction Acts apparently proved that the States of the Confederacy never left. Nevertheless, the 
result was consistent with the Court’s precedents on postwar problems such as the validity of con-
federate bond debt. See Texas, 74 U.S. at 726 (holding that Texas continued as part of the Union 
even after secession); see also HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER 
LAW 460–63 (1982) (discussing importance of holdings in Texas v. White and White v. Hart to the 
Radical Republicans’ program). 
 23. See Herman Belz, Deep-Conviction Jurisprudence and Texas v. White: A Comment on G. 
Edward White’s Historicist Interpretation of Chief Justice Chase, 21 N. KY. L. REV. 117, 123–30 
(1993) (discussing importance of the question and its resolution in Texas v. White). 
 24. Osborn, 80 U.S. at 664 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (“[C]lauses in State constitutions, acts of 
State legislatures, and decisions of State courts, warranted by the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments, cannot be held void as in violation of the original Constitution, which forbids the States to 
pass any law violating the obligation of contracts.”). 
 25. See McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48, 81 (1870) (Peters, J., dissenting) (“The seeming injus-
tice of [enforcing the contract], appears from the fact, that the appellant will be made to pay quite 
eight thousand dollars, in legal funds, to the appellee, for property in persons, now citizens of the 
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ment, the cases ending in White obscured the conflict between old and 
new constitutional orders that was inherent in the slave contract cases.26 
B. Avoidance Through Judicial Means 
The conflict between old and new was more clearly at issue in a se-
ries of cases squarely arguing that the destruction of slavery also de-
stroyed antebellum contracts for slaves. In these cases, the question was 
not whether a state had power to nullify contracts, but rather whether the 
very nature of the contracts rendered them unenforceable. The argument 
came in three forms, each based in commercial law: First, that the end of 
slavery violated warranties that sellers had given as to the quality of their 
slaves. Second, that the end of slavery caused a “failure of consideration” 
that relieved buyers of their obligations under the contract. And third, 
that the end of slavery rendered slave contracts void as against public 
policy. 
The weakest of these arguments posited that emancipation voided 
the seller’s warranty that the slave would be a “slave for life.” Such war-
ranties were boilerplate—default language included in almost all slave 
contracts. They meant that the slave at the heart of the contract was not 
free or physically damaged at the time of sale. They did not guarantee 
that the slave would remain enslaved for the duration of his life or that 
slavery would never come to an end. 
Postwar courts had no problem adopting this interpretation of slave 
warranties. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, rested its decision 
on the distinction between insurance against loss, which the parties could 
have agreed to separately, and a basic warranty as to the nature of the 
slave at sale. Had the parties wished to warrant against the end of slav-
ery, the Court stated, 
they would doubtless have been more explicit in making known that 
intention than by adopting a stereotyped formula, which had been in 
use under an entirely different condition of things for more than two 
hundred years. Such an intention, clearly manifested by the terms 
used, would have imparted to the instrument rather the character of 
                                                                                                                       
State, who had been declared enfranchised by the nation, and whose emancipation the nation was 
most solemnly pledged to make good; and yet, get comparatively nothing of value for his money.”); 
Shorter v. Cobb, 39 Ga. 285, 304 (1869) (“[I]t would be alike rigorous and unjust to hold that credi-
tors were the only class whose property was insured against the contingencies and losses incident to 
the war; that a bond, note, or mortgage was the only property too sacred to be touched, and too se-
cure to be affected during the general wreck of fortunes, and ruin of families.”). 
 26. See Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 645 (1869) (“A change of Constitution can not [sic] 
release a State from a contract made under a Constitution which permits it to be made.”). 
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a “policy of insurance” than that of an ordinary warranty of title and 
of continuous possession.27 
Courts considered agreements for slaves made at such a late date to be 
“risking contracts,”28 gambles that slaves would still have value at the 
end of the Civil War. As a matter of commercial law, the doctrine of em-
inent domain was sufficient to resolve the warranty issue in favor of the 
seller. Time and again, courts reasoned analogically that, just as a seller 
of land does not guarantee against future government confiscation, so too 
did the buyer bear the risk that the government would end the institution 
of slavery.29 
A separate theory, closely related to the warranty claim, argued that 
the end of slavery caused the contracts to suffer from “failure of consid-
eration.” This argument depended in large part on the date of slavery’s 
end: at what point did it become illegal to contract for slaves? The 
Emancipation Proclamation Cases,30 a Texas decision, was exemplary of 
the way courts treated this question. In this particular case, the contracts 
had been made after the Emancipation Proclamation but before the end 
of hostilities between the North and South. The majority’s opinion was 
dedicated to a refutation of the Emancipation Proclamation’s legal force. 
A mere war measure, it was no authority for freedom of its own accord. 
In the court’s view, only a decisive cessation of hostilities could confirm 
slavery’s end, and only slavery’s end could make a contract for slaves 
illegal: “Until slavery was abolished, no feature of it was destroyed. 
Owners of slaves had all the rights of property therein, and the one not 
the least in importance is its vendible quality.”31 For the Texas Supreme 
Court, the Emancipation Proclamation was about timing, not about the 
broader meaning of freedom. 
The dissent to the Emancipation Proclamation Cases, penned by 
Andrew Jackson Hamilton, relied less on exegesis of the Proclamation’s 
legal power and more on the realities that it represented for slave owners. 
Even if the Proclamation could not free the slaves instantaneously, its 
effect was to declare decisively that slavery was contrary to the policy of 
the legitimate government. How, then, could a court now support a con-
tract that ran against that policy? “The question here,” wrote Hamilton, 
is not as to the moment in time when the former slaves in Texas ac-
tually obtained their freedom by events of the war; but it is whether 
                                                     
 27. Walker v. Gatlin, 12 Fla. 9, 14–15 (1867). 
 28. McElvain, 44 Ala. at 55. 
 29. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Calhoun, 2 S.C. 283, 303 (1870); Walker, 12 Fla. at 15–17; Scott v. 
Scott, 59 Va. 150, 176–77 (1868) (Moncure, J., concurring). 
 30. Hall v. Keese, 31 Tex. 504 (1868). 
 31. Id. at 526. 
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now the courts will aid in carrying out and enforcing contracts 
against the public policy of the government, pronounced in the most 
solemn form as both sovereign and belligerent in a great civil war.32 
Hamilton’s dissent was a species of the final major theory against en-
forcement: that slave contracts were void based on public policy. But 
whereas Hamilton had tried to ground the public policy argument on the 
foundation of the Emancipation Proclamation—and indeed, he would 
have upheld slave contracts made prior to its issuance33—other judges 
adopted a broader public policy argument. In Louisiana, the only state 
whose courts consistently nullified slave contracts, judges mixed castiga-
tion of slavery’s morality with somewhat more legalistic analysis in the 
vein of Hamilton’s opinion. For instance, in Wainwright v. Bridges, Lou-
isiana’s foundational slave-contract case, the court opined that slavery 
was a relic of “barbarous ages.”34 It had persisted in American culture as 
a matter of expediency, but “the moral conscience of men no longer 
permitted them to sustain slavery as a thing of right.”35 This broader 
point made, the court went on to hold that slave contracts were abolished 
along with slavery itself: “The fiat of the sovereign is potent to release 
the contracting parties, as well as potent to set the bondman free. Its 
sweep is general, and its wisdom does justice to all.”36 
These passages indicate that judges who refused to enforce slave 
contracts relied primarily on freewheeling application of principles of 
justice. Their opinions contained little exegesis of common law, statute, 
or the Constitution. Most courts, however, were eager to combat a mode 
of thought that did not rely on pure legal reasoning. As the Tennessee 
Supreme Court succinctly put it, “[w]ith the morality of slavery we have 
nothing to do, but simply to announce the laws of property as we find 
them in reference to contracts of this character.”37 In sum, the strategy of 
courts that enforced slave contracts was to adhere to established common 
                                                     
 32. Id. at 553 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. at 552–53 (“As to the executed contracts of this sort, however reprehensible they may 
be, it is a matter of no concern to the courts of the country or to the laws of the land, provided the 
persons who were bought and sold have in fact obtained their freedom.”). 
 34. Wainwright v. Bridges, 19 La. Ann. 234, 238 (1867). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 240. 
 37. Lewis v. Woodfolk, 61 Tenn. 25, 53 (1872); see also McElvain v. Mudd, 44 Ala. 48, 52 
(1870) (“I do not propose to go into an elaborate discussion of the abstract right, or morality of the 
institution of slavery, as it existed in this country before the date of said proclamation. To do so, I am 
persuaded will accomplish no good purpose, and, most probably, we would come out of the discus-
sion but little wiser, and, I think, certainly no better than when we entered upon it.”); Jacoway v. 
Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 636 (1869) (“[W]e must act as rational men; we must accept the law as it was 
and now is with imperfections; we must examine slavery as it was; we must consider the nation, the 
State and the people as they were, not as we think they should have been; and in this view only can 
we arrive at a correct conclusion and duly appreciate the rights of the parties to this suit.”). 
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law precedents. The principles of commercial law that demanded en-
forcement were deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal thought—so 
firmly rooted, in fact, that judges could cite seventeenth-century English 
cases to support the proposition that a buyer bears the risk that the gov-
ernment will take property.38 
Ancient authority did not precisely parallel the problem of slave 
contracts, of course. Slavery had always posed special legal puzzles of its 
own, given the dual nature of the slave as both property and human be-
ing, and questions that defied conventional analysis continued to arise in 
the slave-contract cases. For example, to enforce the contracts, courts 
were required to draw a conceptual distinction between the slave as tan-
gible property—a sort of property that was now illegal—and the mone-
tary value of the slave memorialized on paper. A decision against en-
forcement also posed a unique problem of judicial administration. Was 
there any limitation on these suits? If slave contracts were invalid only 
because slavery was immoral, a party who bought a slave on contract in 
1830 had just as valid a claim that his bargain was null as the buyer who 
completed his contract in 1863.39 Blatant sympathy for slavery played a 
role in the judicial calculus as well. In their most candid moments, judges 
excoriated the non-enforcement theory as a regrettable attack on the 
Southern past.40 
                                                     
 38. Scott v. Scott, 59 Va. 150, 176–77 (1868) (Moncure, J., concurring) (citing Paradine v. 
Jane, [1647] EWHC KB J5).  
 39. See Henderlite v. Thurman, 63 Va. 466, 479 (1872) (“The purchaser of a slave long before 
the war may with equal propriety claim an abatement of the purchase money, upon the ground of a 
failure of title and consideration by act of the government. If he has already paid, he would, for the 
same reason, be equally entitled to recover back such share or proportion of the purchase money as 
would compensate him for the loss sustained.”). 
 The caveat, of course, is that a fully executed contract for slaves did not require the interven-
tion of the courts. Such reasoning was a facile way for judges to avoid the core issue: should the 
judiciary lend its authority to the enforcement of contracts based upon a discredited form of proper-
ty? In the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court, through the Equal Protection Clause, rejected 
attempts to use the judiciary as a means of enforcing private discrimination. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429 (1984); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Similarly, nineteenth century judges 
might have declined to permit private parties to enforce slave contracts in a judicial forum—though 
this would have required the additional step of concluding that slave contracts ran afoul of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. For an argument that Shelley should have been decided on Thirteenth Amend-
ment grounds, see Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New An-
swers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 483–91 (2007). 
 40. Henderlite, 63 Va. at 477 (“The proposition [that the contract is against public policy] 
involves, in my judgment, an admission derogatory to our whole previous history. Notwithstanding 
the institution was recognized as lawful and constitutional by both State and Federal government, 
was sustained by public sentiment, was interwoven with the entire framework of society, and was 
believed by men eminent in wisdom and piety to be in accordance with the principles of religion, 
humanity, and justice; notwithstanding all this, because it has been destroyed by paramount force, 
we are expected not only to give it up without a murmur, but to surrender all our previous convic-
tions, to yield our faith and consciences to the keeping of others, and henceforth to believe that slav-
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Regardless of these nuances, the established forms of the common 
law provided an easy answer to pleas for relief, and postwar courts clung 
to these forms when faced with slave contracts. Had they inquired into 
the meaning of the new Constitution and the Thirteenth Amendment—
and few state judges did—they would have found the issue vastly more 
complicated. 
III. OSBORN V. NICHOLSON AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
COUNTERARGUMENT 
To gain a different view of how to treat slave contracts, we must 
exchange the state courts for the federal circuit courts—specifically the 
Eastern District of Arkansas. In that forum arose Osborn v. Nicholson,41 
which would eventually put a decisive end to the slave-contract contro-
versy. Osborn involved a $1,300 debt for a twenty-three-year-old slave 
named Albert, contracted on the eve of Fort Sumter in March 1861. 
These facts did little to distinguish it from the numerous other slave-
contract cases of the era. Yet Osborn is remarkable for two reasons. 
First, Judge Henry Clay Caldwell’s circuit court decision is the most 
clearly realized opinion against enforcement, not to mention one of the 
few to justify that outcome based on the Thirteenth Amendment.42 Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court’s opinion reversing Caldwell and enforcing the 
contract presented a starkly different view of freedom and personal 
rights—and provided an early example of the postwar Court’s tendency 
to favor established interests over freedmen and other exploited people.43 
Read together, these two writings illustrate alternative visions of the Re-
construction Constitution and the Thirteenth Amendment’s place within 
it. 
A biographical sketch portrays Henry Clay Caldwell as a man who 
“saw the law as an instrument of substantive justice.”44 Caldwell’s Os-
born opinion—a jeremiad against the slave states’ rejection of natural 
liberty and a prophecy for freedom under the Reconstruction Constitu-
tion—certainly supports this characterization. The opinion’s decisional 
                                                                                                                       
ery was wrong in itself—a curse upon our country—a moral leprosy which corrupted the life-blood 
of the nation.”). 
 41. Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F. Cas. 846 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1870) (No. 10,595), rev’d, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 654 (1872). 
 42. Caldwell’s opinion is most certainly flawed. It is a rather baggy document that relies exces-
sively on analogy to other cases. But it is difficult to express how effective the opinion is when it 
breaks free of legalistic form, particularly in the final five pages. 
 43. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 1, at 529–31 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court’s retreat from 
the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 44. Richard S. Arnold & George C. Freeman, III, Judge Henry Clay Caldwell, 23 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 317, 317 (2001). 
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basis is something entirely different than what we see in the state cases, 
including those that forgave the debt. Caldwell’s refusal to enforce was 
not founded on “failure of consideration” or on a technical parsing of the 
state’s power to abrogate slave contracts under the Contracts Clause. 
And while the opinion as a whole might be accurately characterized as a 
public policy argument, Caldwell’s position, unlike other public policy 
arguments, was fully informed by the substantive implications of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
Caldwell made two major points in the course of his opinion. He 
began by drawing a distinction between “natural” law and “municipal” or 
“positive” law. He reasoned that slavery was a violation of natural law 
and supported only by the positive law of the states. Abolition of positive 
slave law destroyed not only the property right in slaves but also the 
remedy by which that right could be enforced: 
It was only by virtue of the slave code of the state, that the plaintiff 
ever could have maintained an action in any court on this contract. 
The common law would afford him no remedy, and the statute giv-
ing the remedy, having been repealed by article 13 of amendments, 
of the constitution of the United States, he is without remedy.45 
In this vision—very much rooted in the antislavery thought of the 
antebellum era—the Thirteenth Amendment serves the remedial purpose 
of restoring the law to its natural state. Because natural law did not re-
spect the right of the slave owner,46 its forms could not justify the en-
forcement of slave contracts once positive law had been swept away.47 
Caldwell might have rested his opinion entirely on this interaction 
between natural and positive law. But his second point went further—he 
analyzed the Thirteenth Amendment as a provision with a substantive 
force of its own. To be sure, the Thirteenth Amendment contained no-
tions of natural law that Caldwell relied on elsewhere in his opinion. The 
Amendment, he wrote, was passed “for the purpose of restoring the 
                                                     
 45. Osborn, 18 F. Cas. at 850. 
 46. For a discussion about the interaction between natural law, positive law, and slavery, see 
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 8–30 (1975). 
 47. Caldwell used similar reasoning to uphold Arkansas’s constitutional prohibition on en-
forcement. Because it was completely within the power of the states to abolish slavery under the old 
Constitution, slaveholding states could sanction abolition without violating the Contracts Clause. See 
Osborn, 18 F. Cas. at 852 (“Now if slave property was excepted from the operation of [the com-
merce] power, on the ground that the power over that subject was exclusively with the several states, 
upon which principle of logic or rule of construction can it be claimed that the constitution of the 
United States throws its protecting shield over the slave dealer, and the contracts growing out of that 
traffic?”). Caldwell pointed out that the state’s authority over slavery was so great that it was justi-
fied to destroy the marriage contract between Dred Scott and his wife once Scott was taken from 
freedom and brought back to slavery in Missouri. If the state power over slavery could be used to 
destroy a marriage contract, then certainly it could be used to destroy a contract for slaves. Id. at 851. 
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slaves to their natural rights, and conforming the institutions and laws of 
the republic and of the several states to the immutable law of eternal jus-
tice, and making the fact conform to the theory upon which our form of 
government is based.”48 But when viewed alongside the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment not only restored natural law, 
but also established its own positive law of freedom: 
The effect of these amendments cannot be limited to the mere sev-
erance of the legal relation of master and slave. They are farreach-
ing in their results. Under them the former slave is now a citizen, 
possessing and enjoying all the rights of other citizens of the repub-
lic. Can any one doubt that it was the object and purpose of these 
amendments to strike down slavery and all its incidents, and all 
rights of action based upon it?49 
By focusing on citizenship and the incidents of slavery, Caldwell sug-
gested that the Thirteenth Amendment was a substantive embodiment of 
liberty with which slave contracts could not be reconciled. 
In the most evocative part of his opinion—indeed, the most vivid 
passage to appear in any of the slave-contract cases—Caldwell provides 
his interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment in an even more tangible 
form: 
[T]his court, in the trial of [a claim for breach of a slave warranty], 
must inquire into the mental and physical condition of a citizen of 
the republic, with a view of ascertaining his value as a chattel. And 
it may chance that the subject of this inquiry is a juror or officer of 
the court, and indeed it might occur that the judge on the bench 
would be the subject of such an inquiry. The mind revolts at the trial 
of such an issue. It would be giving full force and effect to one of the 
most obnoxious features of the slave code. It would be placing the 
free man, who may be the subject matter of such a suit, in an atti-
tude before the court and the country that no free government will 
permit, jealous of the rights and honor of its citizens, and whose 
policy is to instill into their minds a love of country and its free in-
stitutions. The government that would permit its free citizens to be 
thus degraded in the interest of slavery and slave traders, would be 
unworthy of the name of a free republic.50 
With this passage, Caldwell turned the warranty argument, so easily dis-
missed by other courts, on its head. On this view, the warranty in a slave 
contract was more than boilerplate. It provided a license to inspect a 
freedman in exactly the same fashion as if he had been a slave. Cald-
                                                     
 48. Id. at 854–55. 
 49. Id. at 855 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. (emphasis added). 
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well’s scenario, even if fanciful,51 provided a powerful argument that 
slave contracts were incidents of slavery barred by the Thirteenth 
Amendment. By contrasting slavery’s incidents to citizenship rights, 
Caldwell provided a more concrete basis for decision than the fuzzier 
notions of natural law and public policy. A citizen could never be the 
subject of contract. How then could a freedman? 
The Supreme Court, with only Chief Justice Chase dissenting, re-
futed every aspect of Caldwell’s reasoning. It rejected the notion that 
slavery was law only in jurisdictions where supported by statute: “Being 
valid when and where it was made, [the contract] was so everywhere.”52 
In the Court’s view, slaves had long been “covered by the same protec-
tion as other property.”53 Eradication of the positive law of slavery did 
not eradicate the common law of contract. Given that slaves were a legal 
form of property when the contract was made, the question of enforcea-
bility was governed by the principles of contract law. The most relevant 
analogy was to eminent domain. Just as the buyer of real property bore 
the risk that the government would convert it to public use, so too the 
buyer of a slave bore the risk that the government would eliminate slav-
ery as a valid form of property.54 In short, much of the language upon 
which the Court based its opinion could have been lifted from one of the 
many state decisions on the issue. 
Had the Court stopped there, the opinion would have been notable 
mainly for its unique posture. It did not stop there, however. Instead, it 
explained why the case implicated due process—that of former slave-
holders. By the time of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court explained, 
the right of the seller to his payment had become “legally and completely 
vested.”55 The real danger of Caldwell’s ruling was that refusal to en-
force a vested contract right would “take away one man’s property and 
give it to another. . . . [T]he deprivation would be without due process of 
law. This is forbidden by the fundamental principles of the social com-
pact, and is beyond the sphere of the legislative authority both of the 
States and the Nation.”56 In short, the Court went beyond the proper ap-
plication of common law rules to announce a philosophy of natural liber-
ty and substantive justice—one completely at odds with Caldwell’s.57 
                                                     
 51. In fact, after the Civil War, juries did sometimes decide whether certain slaves had been 
“defective” under a warranty. See Trimble v. Isbell, 51 Ala. 356, 358 (1874). 
 52. Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872). 
 53. Id. at 661. 
 54. Id. at 659. 
 55. Id. at 662. 
 56. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. See id. at 663 (“Whatever we may think of the institution of slavery viewed in the light of 
religion, morals, humanity, or a sound political economy,-as the obligation here in question was 
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Indeed, this is the very sort of substantive due process argument that the 
Court would use to protect economic rights well into the twentieth centu-
ry.58 
The Osborn case is important not simply for ending the slave-
contract dispute, but for presenting two opposing visions of the postwar 
constitutional order. In the Court’s view, the Reconstruction Amend-
ments did little to alter the relationship between the individual property 
owner and the state. For sure, they forbade slavery and compensation for 
the loss of slaves. But where these specific prohibitions did not speak, 
the individual retained the extent of his property interest. Natural law 
was relevant only insofar as it required protection of a private, vested 
right—even if that right found its roots in slavery. 
For Caldwell, the issue was more complex. The Reconstruction 
Amendments did not merely abolish slavery—they altered the entirety of 
the constitutional structure. Though the antebellum Constitution would 
have given the seller a remedy, the new Constitution demanded a differ-
ent result.59 Most fundamentally, the Thirteenth Amendment ensured that 
individual property interests would no longer take precedence over the 
liberty rights of freedmen as a class. Caldwell saw his role as to decide 
whether “the good of the community at large is taken to be of more im-
portance than the claim of the individual.”60 That decision was not based 
on Caldwell’s own predilections. Rather, it was moored to the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which showed that “slavery is condemned in all its fea-
tures.”61 Indeed, Caldwell appears to be the first judge to have read the 
Thirteenth Amendment as an affirmative prohibition on the relics of 
slavery. 
But Caldwell’s broader view was not to be the law. Under the 
Court’s interpretation of the new Constitution, the decisive question—
answered as soon it was asked—was whether enforcement carried 
freedmen back into literal slavery. As the Court saw it, “[n]either the 
                                                                                                                       
valid when executed, sitting as a court of justice, we have no choice but to give it effect.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 58. See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 17–25 (2007) (tracing devel-
opment of the concept of civil rights from Reconstruction to the New Deal). 
 59. Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F. Cas. 846, 854 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1870) (No. 10,595) (“These 
amendments are the work of the sovereign people of the United States. There are no technical rules 
to obstruct or prevent their full operation presently on all persons, matters, and things within their 
scope. Obligation of contracts and vested rights, based on slavery, cannot be set up to impede or 
restrain their operation. And no one can escape from their operation by the cry of the ‘constitution as 
it was.’”). 
 60. Id. at 855. 
 61. Id. 
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rights nor the interests of those held lately in bondage [were] affected” 
by enforcement of a slave contract.62 
IV. CONTRACTS FOR SLAVES BY SLAVES 
To the trained legal mind, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Os-
born has a satisfying logic. In the field of law, there is nothing especially 
problematic about separating the right to a thing from the possession of 
the thing itself. The slave had her freedom—the use of her own body—
and that was as it should be. But why should that freedom affect in the 
least a disembodied right to the slave’s labor? As Professor Kull has ar-
gued, there was a certain dissonance in making the seller bear the loss of 
the slave. Refusal to enforce the slave contracts made emancipation ret-
roactive to sellers, who by a temporal trick lost the value of their proper-
ty even where it had remained valid in law.63 Morally satisfying as void-
ing the contract may have been, it could not make emancipation retroac-
tive to the slaves themselves, who of course remained in bondage until 
the end of the war. 
This reasoning is complicated, however, if we consider a particular 
type of contract that has eluded the attention of scholars: one where the 
buying party was himself a former slave purchasing freedom for his fam-
ily. In such cases, enforcement of the contract had an opposite temporal 
effect than it did when the parties were exclusively white. Rather than 
simply vindicating the white seller by refusing to make emancipation of 
his slave retroactive, enforcement carried forward the shackles of slavery 
well beyond the institution’s expiration date. In a very real sense, a 
freedman forced to make good on his antebellum agreements was still 
chained to his master. And this realization forces us to reconsider the 
assumption that freedmen were unaffected by being the subject of an an-
tebellum contract between whites. 
Consider Andrews v. Page.64 In December 1857, Henry Page, a free 
man of color and owner of 321 acres of land,65 made an agreement with 
William B. Andrews, a Tennessee slave owner. In exchange for a $3,200 
bill of sale, Page received three slaves: Page’s wife, Dilly, and Page’s 
                                                     
 62. Osborn, 80 U.S. at 663. 
 63. See Kull, supra note 3, at 494 (“Nullification . . . pushed back the effective date of emanci-
pation as between these buyers and sellers, denying to the seller the fruit of his favorable bargain and 
relieving the buyer from the consequences of his unfavorable one.”). 
 64. Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 653 (1871). 
 65. Page possessed equitable title to all but thirteen acres of the land. Record of Prior Proceed-
ings, Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 653 (1871) (on file at Tennessee State Library and Ar-
chives, Manuscript Section, box 2404). An equitable titleholder enjoys use and possession of land 
but does not have actual ownership. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “ben-
eficial owner”). 
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children, Bill and Britt. When the note came due in January 1861, Page 
was nowhere to be found. Andrews placed an attachment on Page’s 
property, but the Civil War’s intervention prevented him from carrying it 
out. During the war, Page died working on a sawmill, leaving his family 
to live on the land. Though the war freed Page’s family, it had not freed 
Page of his obligation to Andrews. Andrews thus sought to take the Page 
property in satisfaction of the note. 
The resulting opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court is a remark-
able illustration of how the vestiges of slavery continued to loom over 
freedmen after the Civil War. The court expressly declined to decide the 
case on the basis of the Thirteenth Amendment, or to inquire whether 
Page freed his family when he purchased them.66 It did not address 
whether the contract was valid or whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
prohibited attachment.67 Instead, it decided the case under the law of 
slave marriages. Because that law recognized that Page and Dilly had 
entered into a valid marriage while enslaved, and because a postwar stat-
ute ratified that law, Dilly was entitled to a dower interest in the proper-
ty.68 
That a freedwoman could take her former owner to court and win a 
judgment in her favor may seem a startling result. But, at least in Dilly 
Page’s case, success was deceptive. The court never considered the pos-
sibility that the contract might have been invalid because made for 
slaves—or that the purchaser was not a coequal white slave owner, but 
rather a husband and father purchasing his wife and children.69 Through 
dower, Dilly would be able to keep part of her land.70 But it would only 
                                                     
 66. Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 658 (“The rights of the parties can not be determined upon the consti-
tution and laws as they now exist, but are to be ascertained under the constitution and laws as they 
existed . . . at the time of the death of Henry Page, in 1864.”). Cf. Osborn, 18 F. Cas. at 854 (“It must 
not be forgotten that this question must be determined under the constitution of the United States, as 
it stands now.”). 
 67. Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 656. 
 68. Id. at 670–71. 
 69. See id. at 658 (“Dilly presented a petition for rehearing, in which she alleged that Harry had 
not purchased her for the purpose of making her his slave, but as a wife, and to make her a free 
woman.”). The case does not indicate whether Page himself had once been Andrews’s slave, or 
whether he had always been free. My research has shown that Page was born around 1788 in Virgin-
ia. SMITH COUNTY, TENNESSEE, CENSUS OF 1850, at 164 (Thomas E. Partlow ed.) (on file at Ten-
nessee State Library and Archives). One explanation for Page’s move—perhaps the best explanation, 
considering that the natural path of migration for a free black prior to the Civil War was northward 
rather than southward—is that a master or slave trader transported him to Tennessee. 
 70. My estimation is that she would get to keep 107 acres. Dower typically protected one-third 
of the husband’s real property, and Andrews explicitly held that the property over which Henry Page 
held equitable title would be included. Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 670–71. Of course, this seems like a 
rather large chunk of land. But the amount of land is not really relevant to my argument—the point 
remains that Dilly’s former owner could strip her of over two hundred acres of land because her 
slave status was enshrined in a contract. 
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be a part. Andrews was entitled to satisfy the debt Henry Page contracted 
for Dilly’s freedom from the rest.71 Furthermore, the Page children were 
unprotected, because the court awarded Andrews a remainder in the 
property that was subject to dower.72 Unless the debt could be repaid, no 
future generation of Pages would enjoy this land. 
The Thirteenth Amendment emancipated Dilly Page and forbade 
that she ever again be treated as property. But it did not prevent her for-
mer owner from continuing to extract value from her. In one sense, Hen-
ry Page’s contract was no different than numerous other contracts for 
slaves—Andrews acquired the contract right when slave property was 
legal, and abolition of a slave’s status as property did not also abolish the 
right. Yet Page’s contract also had a key difference—it permitted Dilly’s 
former master to take land that would rightfully be hers but for her prior 
status as a slave. Enforcement meant that Dilly was not truly free from 
her obligations to her master. This was most certainly not, as the Su-
preme Court wrote in Osborn, a situation where “[n]either the rights nor 
the interests of those . . . lately in bondage [were] affected.”73 
By showing the freedman not as abstract “consideration” for mon-
ey, but instead as a live human being, Andrews v. Page forces us to reas-
sess enforcement’s broader implications for emancipation. It is true that 
very few slave-contract cases placed upon freedmen the sort of real bur-
den that enforcement caused Dilly Page. There is no evidence that courts 
were awash in claims by whites against their former slaves. But this sin-
gle agreement alone brings the entirety of the slave-contract edifice into 
sharp relief. Enforcement of every one of these contracts hinged on an 
assumption that former slaves were less than fully free. If slave contracts 
could be enforced, freedmen retained something of their character of 
property—even if expressed as “vested rights” instead of tangible owner-
ship. This was not a harmless attitude in an era where a major aspiration 
of the moneyed Southern class was to retain the labor relations that pre-
vailed during slavery.74 
Andrews v. Page provides a different perspective on the slave-
contract problem—one in which it is much easier to see slave contracts 
as an outcropping of slavery that should have been barred under the Thir-
teenth Amendment. For freed slaves such as Dilly Page, who still owed 
money on the purchase price of their freedom, the authority of the master 
                                                     
 71. Id. at 671. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 663 (1872). 
 74. See FONER, supra note 1, at 428 (“Equally important among the aims of violence was the 
restoration of labor discipline on white-owned farms and plantations. In a sense, the Klan sought to 
take the place of both the departed personal authority of the master and the labor control function the 
Reconstruction state had abandoned.”). 
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and his entitlement to take their property represented a direct return to 
the law of slavery. These contracts re-imposed the legal incidents of 
slave status. Perhaps these implications were not so obvious in the run-
of-the-mill dispute between white buyers. Yet, some visionaries, such as 
Caldwell, saw them. The failure of his fellow jurists to join him marks 
perhaps the first missed opportunity for courts to embrace the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s possibilities. 
CONCLUSION 
The past has a powerful hold on legal minds. Reconstruction-era 
judges, as much as any, were eager to “roll back the tide of time, and to 
imagine ourselves in the presence of the circumstances by which the par-
ties were surrounded when and where the contract is said to have been 
made.”75 The slave-contract cases are consistent with that rule. As Aviam 
Soifer has said of the post-bellum period, “the most private and individu-
alistic legal categories seemed quickly and convincingly to overcome all 
others. Contract law triumphed in the legal imagination and permeated 
popular belief.”76 In an era that elevated the formal power to contract 
above all, perhaps it is not so remarkable that most judges had nothing to 
say about the freedmen upon which litigants’ contractual rights were 
based. 
What is remarkable is the lengths to which most courts went to ig-
nore the Thirteenth Amendment when asked to enforce contracts for 
slaves. The Amendment marked a positive enactment of the natural-law 
prohibition on slavery. Yet the Supreme Court ignored this positive law 
in favor of natural-law principles forbidding truncation of property 
rights. The Amendment promised a revolution in the relationship be-
tween the federal government and the states—one that permitted the fed-
eral government to wipe away the sort of state-law contract doctrines that 
countenanced enforcement of slave contracts. Yet when the Supreme 
Court enforced the federal Constitution against the states, it gave the 
Contracts Clause, not the Thirteenth Amendment, primacy of place. At 
worst, these attitudes could actually re-enslave freedmen. Though Henry 
Clay Caldwell probably did not have the likes of Dilly Page in mind 
when he ruled, he understood that slave contracts, even if once legal, 
could not exist in the world the Thirteenth Amendment had made. Tradi-
tional forms of adjudication could not answer everything. As we contin-
                                                     
 75. Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 30 (1875). In this case, the Court concluded that a former 
slave could not assert a contractual claim over cotton seized by the U.S. Army during the Civil War 
because slaves had no legal ability to contract. 
 76. Aviam Soifer, Contract, Status, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 1941–42 (1987). 
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ue to test the Thirteenth Amendment’s role in modern law, that is an ap-
proach worth heeding. 
 
